Sexual Orientation Equality and Religious Exceptionalism in the Law of the United Kingdom: The Role of the Church of England by Johnson, P & Vanderbeck, RM
This is a repository copy of Sexual Orientation Equality and Religious Exceptionalism in 
the Law of the United Kingdom: The Role of the Church of England.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121980/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Johnson, P and Vanderbeck, RM orcid.org/0000-0003-0274-3505 (Cover date: 1 Oct 
2017) Sexual Orientation Equality and Religious Exceptionalism in the Law of the United 
Kingdom: The Role of the Church of England. Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 6 (3). 
pp. 498-522. ISSN 2047-0770 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwx051
© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press. This is a pre-copyedited, 
author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion following peer review. The version of record: Johnson, P and Vanderbeck, RM 
(2017) Sexual Orientation Equality and Religious Exceptionalism in the Law of the United 
Kingdom: The Role of the Church of England, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 6 (3), 
pp. 498–522, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwx051. Uploaded in 
accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION EQUALITY AND RELIGIOUS 
EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM:  
THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 
 
PAUL JOHNSON* AND ROBERT M. VANDERBECK** 
 
 
 
 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, University of York, Heslington, 
York YO10 5DD, England, paul.johnson@york.ac.uk 
 
** Professor of Human Geography, School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds 
LS2 9JT, England, r.vanderbeck@leeds.ac.uk 
  
	 2	
SEXUAL ORIENTATION EQUALITY AND RELIGIOUS 
EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM:  
THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There is a growing literature that addresses the appropriateness and merits of 
including exceptions in law to accommodate faith-based objections to homosexuality. 
However, what has rarely been considered and, as a consequence, what is generally 
not understood, is how such religious exceptions come to exist in law. This article 
provides a detailed analysis of the contribution of the Church of England to ensuring 
the inclusion of religious exceptions in United Kingdom legislation designed to 
promote equality on the grounds of sexual orientation. Drawing on a case study that 
traces the life of one piece of anti-discrimination legislation, the article documents the 
multi-faceted approach of the Church of England to seeking, securing and shaping 
religious exceptions in law. The analysis contributes to broader debates about the 
role of the Church of England in Parliament and the extent to which the United 
Kingdom, as a liberal democracy, should continue to accommodate the ChurchÕs 
doctrine on homosexuality in statute law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a wide range of law has been enacted 
in the United Kingdom that is designed to address discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation. In the process of enacting this law, legislators have often sought to 
accommodate faith-based objections to homosexuality and sexual orientation equality. 
	 3	
Such accommodation has resulted in the inclusion in legislation of numerous 
Ôreligious exceptionsÕ that exempt religious individuals and organisations from the 
requirement to treat people equally regardless of sexual orientation. For example, 
religious organisations have been provided with bespoke exceptions in legislation that 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in respect of public 
services and functions, premises and associations.
1
 Similar religious exceptions can 
be found in legislation relating to, for instance, civil partnership, employment, and 
marriage.
2
  
 
There is a growing academic and policy literature in the United Kingdom
3
 and 
beyond
4
 that addresses the appropriateness and merits of accommodating faith-based 
objections, either at an individual or organisational level, to equal treatment based on 
sexual orientation. However, what has rarely been considered and, as a consequence, 
what is generally not understood, is how religious exceptions come to exist in law. 
Therefore, this article provides a detailed examination and critical account of the 
process by which religious exceptions have become included in United Kingdom 
legislation. By scrutinizing the influence of organised religion on the work of policy 
makers and legislators, the article provides an in-depth understanding of how faith-
based objections to homosexuality are transformed into legal provisions that exempt 
religious individuals and organisations from legal requirements to treat people equally 
regardless of sexual orientation. 
																																																								
1
 Equality Act 2010, sch 23, para 2; Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 
2006, reg 16.  
2
 For a broad discussion see Paul Johnson and Robert M Vanderbeck, Law, Religion and 
Homosexuality (Routledge 2014). 
3
 Russell Sandberg and Norman Doe, ÔReligious exemptions in discrimination lawÕ (2007) 66(2) The 
Cambridge Law Journal 302-312; Ian Leigh, ÔRecent developments in religious libertyÕ (2009) 11(1) 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 65-72; Carl F Stychin, ÔFaith in the future: sexuality, religion and the public 
sphereÕ (2009) 29(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 729-755; Davina Cooper and Didi Herman, ÔUp 
against the property logic of equality law: conservative Christian accommodation claims and gay 
rightsÕ (2013) 21(1) Feminist Legal Studies 61-80; Robert Wintemute, ÔAccommodating religious 
beliefs: harm, clothing or symbols, and refusals to serve othersÕ (2014) 77(2) The Modern Law Review 
223-253. 
4
 Elsje Bonthuys, ÔIrrational accommodation: conscience, religion and same-sex marriages in South 
AfricaÕ (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 473-482; Laura S Underkuffler, ÔOdious discrimination 
and the religious exemption questionÕ (2010-11) 32 Cardozo Law Review 2069-2091; Douglas 
NeJaime, ÔMarriage inequality: same-sex relationships, religious exemptions, and the production of 
sexual orientation discriminationÕ (2012) 100 California Law Review 1169-1238; Nomi Maya 
Stolzenberg and Douglas NeJaime, ÔIntroduction: religious accommodation in the age of civil rightsÕ 
(2015) 38 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender vii-xiii; Jonas Lindberg, ÔRenegotiating the role of 
majority churches in Nordic parliamentary debates on same-sex unionsÕ (2016) 58 Journal of Church 
and State 80-97. 
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This article focuses attention on the contribution of the Church of England 
(hereinafter ÔCoEÕ) to the process by which religious exceptions become included in 
United Kingdom sexual orientation equality law. It does so because of the wide range 
of ways in which the CoE is able to influence the legislative process in order to 
actively shape statute law.
 5
 Such influence is possible because of the representation 
that the CoE has in the United Kingdom Parliament, most notably in the form of the 
26 Lords Spiritual who sit in the House of Lords,
6
 as well as the Second Church 
Estates Commissioner who sits in the House of Commons.
7
 Alongside its formal 
parliamentary capacities, the CoE is also able to exercise considerable influence on 
the legislative process through its ArchbishopsÕ Council. The work of the Council 
involves, amongst other things, Ômonitoring of Government policy where proposed 
legislative and other changes may bear directly on the [CoE]Õ.
8
 This ÔmonitoringÕ 
often takes the form of the Council making active interventions in the legislative 
process by, for example, meeting with civil servants who are members of a ÔBill 
teamÕ or by making written or oral submissions to parliamentary Select Committees.  
Further, a senior bishop of the CoE serves as the chairman of the elected governors of 
the ChurchesÕ Legislation Advisory Service (which succeeded the Churches Main 
Committee in 2008), a Judeo-Christian ecumenical charity that negotiates with 
Government on behalf of its membership.
9
  
 
																																																								
5
 We are concerned in this article with the influence of the CoE on statute law made by the UK 
Parliament and not with the law that the CoE, through its General Synod, makes either by Canon or 
Measure. Measures, which require the approval of Parliament and Royal Assent, and Canons, which 
require Royal Assent and Licence, are forms of legislation dealing with matters of the CoE. 
6
 These comprise the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishops of London, Durham and 
Winchester, and the longest serving of the other qualifying diocesan bishops. The current number of 
Lords Spiritual permitted to sit in the House of Lords was set by An Act for establishing the Bishoprick 
of Manchester, and amending certain Acts relating to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England 
1847 (10 & 11 Vict c 108).  
7
 The Second Church Estates Commissioner is an elected Member of Parliament appointed by the 
Crown. 
8
 ArchbishopsÕ Council of the Church of England, ÔThe ArchbishopsÕ CouncilÕ (2017) available at: 
https://www.churchofengland.org/about-us/structure/archbishopscouncil.aspx#Objects 
9
 ChurchesÕ Legislation Advisory Service, ÔAnnual report for the year ending 31 December 2008Õ 
(2009) available at: 
http://www.churcheslegislation.org.uk/files/reports/CLAS_Annual_Report_and_Accounts_2008.pdf. 
The charityÕs nine governors currently include three from the CoE (including the chairman, Alastair 
Redfern, Bishop of Derby) and one each from the Salvation Army, Roman Catholic Church, United 
Reform Church, the Baptist Union, the Methodist Church, and the Free Churches Group.  
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Understanding the role of the CoE in fashioning religious exceptions in sexual 
orientation equality law is important, not only because of the potent position it 
occupies in the legislative process but because of its established doctrine on 
homosexuality. Despite considerable internal debate regarding issues of human 
sexuality,
10
 the authoritative statements of the CoE on homosexuality hold that 
Ôhomosexual genital acts É fall short of [the] idealÕ that Ôsexual intercourse is an act 
of total commitment which belongs properly within a permanent [opposite-sex] 
married relationshipÕ.
11
 Furthermore, the CoE officially respects the resolution of the 
worldwide Anglican Communion that Ôhomosexual practice [is] incompatible with 
ScriptureÕ.
12
 It is from this standpoint that the CoE attempts to shape legislation in 
order to ensure the inclusion of provisions that accommodate the practice of its 
doctrine.  
 
In order to facilitate an understanding of how the CoE influences United Kingdom 
sexual orientation equality law, we adopt a case study approach that focuses on the 
life of one piece of legislation: the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003 (hereinafter ÔEESOR 2003Õ). This approach allows for an in-depth 
investigation of the ways in which the CoE has attempted to influence the legislative 
process and its success in doing so. The CoEÕs interventions in the legislative process 
are often multi-faceted and, as we explained above, involve interactions between CoE 
representatives and a wide range of parliamentary and civil service stakeholders. This 
case study approach therefore allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
various strategies employed by the CoE to shape legislation in particular ways.  
 
																																																								
10
 See, for example, Robert M Vanderbeck, Gill Valentine, Kevin Ward, Joanna Sadgrove and Johan 
Andersson, ÔThe meanings of communion: Anglican identities, the sexuality debates, and Christian 
relationalityÕ (2010) 15(2) Sociological Research Online. 
11
 Motion of the General Synod, 11 November 1987. This motion of the General Synod and Issues in 
Human Sexuality: A Statement by the House of Bishops (Church of England House of Bishops (1991) 
London: Church House Publishing) are considered the two authoritative statements of the CoE on 
homosexuality. See ArchbishopsÕ Council of the Church of England, ÔHomosexualityÕ (2017) available 
at: https://www.churchofengland.org/our-views/marriage,-family-and-sexuality-issues/human-
sexuality/homosexuality.aspx 
12
 Lambeth Conference 1998, Resolution I.10.  See also ArchbishopsÕ Council of the Church of 
England, ibid. 
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The EESOR 2003 was a significant piece of legislation that, for the first time, made it 
unlawful to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation in employment.
13
 The 
EESOR 2003 prohibited direct discrimination,
14
 indirect discrimination,
15
 
victimization,
16
 and harassment
17
 on the grounds of sexual orientation in employment 
and vocational training. The EESOR 2003 contained a number of exceptions that 
permitted a difference of treatment based on sexual orientation in particular 
circumstances. One exception, for instance, made provision for those circumstances 
where being of a particular sexual orientation is a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement for a post, and it is proportionate to apply that requirement 
in the particular case.
18
 The EESOR 2003 also contained a religious exception for a 
requirement related to sexual orientation to be applied by an employer where the 
employment is for purposes of an organised religion.
19
 This religious exception 
provides the particular focus of our analysis. 
 
In the remainder of this article, we trace the development of the religious exception in 
the EESOR 2003 through a number of stages: first, we examine the background to the 
EESOR 2003 in European Union law; second, we consider the process by which the 
religious exception in the EESOR 2003 was conceived and drafted; third, we examine 
the parliamentary passage of the EESOR 2003 and the scrutiny of the religious 
exception by both Houses of the United Kingdom Parliament; fourth, we consider the 
judicial interpretation of the religious exception; and fifth, we consider further 
parliamentary scrutiny of the religious exception during the process by which the 
EESOR 2003 was consolidated in the Equality Act 2010. At every stage of our 
analysis, our principal aim is to show the critical role of the CoE in ensuring that it 
and other organised religions be provided with a bespoke exception enabling religious 
employers to continue to discriminate on grounds related to sexual orientation.  
 
 
																																																								
13
 EESOR 2003 applied to Great Britain from commencement on 1 December 2003; similar provisions 
in the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2003 commenced on 
2 December 2003 and remain in force. 
14
 EESOR 2003, reg 3(1)(a). 
15
 ibid reg 3(1)(b). 
16
 ibid reg 4. 
17
 ibid reg 5. 
18
 ibid reg 7(2).  
19
 ibid reg 7(3). 
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II. THE BACKGROUND TO THE EESOR 2003:  
EUROPEAN UNION COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2000/78/EC 
 
The EESOR 2003 gave effect to obligations imposed on the United Kingdom by 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of the European Union (hereinafter Ôthe DirectiveÕ) 
which established a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation.
20
 The Directive was first proposed in 1999 as a means of putting into 
effect in member states of the European Union Ôthe principle of equal treatment as 
regards access to employment and occupation, including promotion, vocational 
training, employment conditions and membership of certain organisations, of all 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientationÕ.
21
 At the outset, the Directive proposed to prohibit all direct and 
indirect discrimination, harassment
22
 and victimization
23
 in respect of the 
aforementioned personal characteristics, except in cases when a characteristic 
constituted a Ôgenuine occupational qualificationÕ.
24
 The proposed Directive contained 
two provisions in respect of genuine occupational qualifications: first, a general 
exception for particular occupational activities or contexts for which a characteristic 
constituted a genuine occupational qualification;
25
 and second, a religious exception 
for circumstances when certain jobs or occupations need to be performed by 
employees who share the religious opinion of their employing organisation.
26
 This 
religious exception (hereinafter referred to as the ÔArticle 4(2) exceptionÕ) was 
originally formulated as follows: 
 
Member States may provide that, in the case of public or private organisations 
which pursue directly and essentially the aim of ideological guidance in the 
field of religion or belief with respect to education, information and the 
expression of opinions, and for the particular occupational activities within 
those organisations which are directly and essentially related to that aim, a 
																																																								
20
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, Official Journal L 303, 02/12/2000, P 0016Ð0022.  
21
 Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, Official Journal C 177 E, 27/06/2000, P 0042Ð0046, art 1. 
22
 ibid art 2.  
23
 ibid art 10.  
24
 ibid art 4.  
25
 ibid art 4(1). 
26
 ibid art 4(2).  
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difference of treatment based on a relevant characteristic related to religion or 
belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of 
these activities, the characteristic constitutes a genuine occupational 
qualification.
27
 
 
When the proposed Directive was published, there was considerable criticism of the 
Article 4(2) exception by members of the United Kingdom Parliament. For example, 
the House of Lords Select Committee on European Union stated that Article 4(2) was 
Ônarrow and convolutedÕ, Ôlikely to limit the ability of religious organisations to apply 
the Ôgenuine occupational qualificationÕ principleÕ, and Ôits meaning and scope should 
be clarifiedÕ.
28
 The House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny went 
further, suggesting that Article 4(2) should be deleted.
29
  
 
The debates in the United Kingdom Parliament on the proposed Directive focused on 
whether Article 4(2) was a broad
30
 or narrow
31
 exception. The CoE, from the outset, 
expressed its Ôconsiderable anxietyÕ about Article 4(2).
32
 To illustrate this anxiety, the 
Bishop of Southwark (Tom Butler), used the example of Ôa gay man, open and proud 
about his sexuality and practice, being appointed as a teacher in a voluntary-aided 
Muslim schoolÕ whereupon Ôsuch an appointment would so undermine the Muslim 
ethos of the school that parents might lose confidence in the school and its future 
might come under threat, to the detriment of the pupilsÕ.
33
 Although Bishop Butler 
stated that it was Ôa little embarrassing to be seen to be arguing against any of the 
proposals of the directivesÕ, he argued that the Ôlegitimate anxieties of the faith 
communitiesÕ must be addressed.
34
 Implicit to Bishop ButlerÕs argument was the view 
that religious employers should be able to continue to discriminate against people on 
the grounds of sexual orientation.  
 
																																																								
27
 ibid. 
28
 House of Lords, European Union Committee, Ninth Report (16 May 2000) para 111. 
29
 House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, Nineteenth Report (24 May 2000) para 2.18. 
30
 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, HL Deb 30 Jun 2000, vol 614, col 1191. 
31
 Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach, ibid col 1209. 
32
 Bishop of Southwark (Tom Butler), ibid col 1199.  
33
 ibid. 
34
 ibid cols 1199Ð1200.  
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It is clear that most European Union officials did not share the view expressed by the 
CoE on the proposed Directive. A report by the European Parliament stated that 
Article 4(2) Ôwill apply only to religious beliefs and not, for example, to sexual 
orientationÕ,
35
 and many members of the European Parliament were concerned to 
ensure that the scope of the religious exception remain very narrow: 
 
It is essential that discrimination on religious grounds should not be a pretext 
to discriminate against employees on other grounds, for example, because they 
are homosexual. I am sure that sensible and moderate religious organisations 
would not seek to do so to exploit this as a loophole. But we must not allow 
fundamentalists with prejudiced views of any religion to allow their views to 
prevail against the non-discrimination standards of secular society.
36
 
 
To ensure the narrowness of the religious exception, the European Parliament agreed 
a change of wording to Article 4(2)
37
 that was not ultimately incorporated into the 
Directive. Rather, the text agreed by the Council of the European Union, which 
resulted from negotiations in a working group that took place in private,
38
 effectively 
broadened the scope of Article 4(2) in order to strengthen the protection given to 
religious organisations. This was achieved by way of the inclusion of a proviso which, 
in addition to the text permitting a difference of treatment based on a personÕs religion 
or belief in the case of occupational activities within churches and other organisations 
with a religious or belief ethos (when a personÕs religion or belief constitute a 
genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement), states: 
 
Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive shall 
thus not prejudice the right of churches and other public or private 
organisations, the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, acting in 
conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals 
																																																								
35
 European Parliament, ÔReport on the proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupationÕ, 21 September 2000, A5-0264/2000.  
36
 Sarah Ludford MEP, European Parliament Debate 4 October 2000.  
37
 European Parliament, Texts Adopted, 5 October 2000, Proposal for a Council Directive establishing 
a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, Amendment 37. See also 
Amended proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, Official Journal C 62 E, 27/2/2001, P 0152Ð0163. 
38
 For a discussion of this process see House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Fourth 
Report (19 December 2000) paras 10Ð11.  
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working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisationÕs 
ethos.
39
  
 
The scope of this proviso, as we explain below, has been the source of much 
contention in the United Kingdom in respect of sexual orientation discrimination. 
Although Article 4(2) is clear that any difference of treatment Ôshould not justify 
discrimination on another groundÕ,
40
 it has been interpreted to permit a difference in 
treatment based on Ôsexual conductÕ rather than Ôsexual orientationÕ. As Tessa Jowell 
MP, then Minister of State at the Department for Education and Employment, 
explained at the point the Directive was adopted, Article 4(2) Ôdoes not go so far as to 
permit discrimination on any other ground Ð including sexual orientationÕ and 
therefore, for example, if the Roman Catholic church sought to appoint a community 
worker to run a centre for young people it would not be entitled to discriminate 
between two Catholic applicants Ôsimply on the basis of their sexual orientationÕ.
41
 
However, as Mrs Jowell went on to explain, the Ôchurch may have appointed an 
applicant who turned out to be gay [and] Article 4(2) É could É allow the church to 
take action if the Community worker subsequently behaved in a manner which tended 
to undermine the ethos of the centreÕ.
42
 Mrs Jowell elaborated that religious 
organisations could not refuse to employ someone simply because of their ÔidentityÕ 
but could refuse to employ someone if their ÔbehaviourÕ was at variance with Ôthe 
values and beliefs of the organisationÕ.
43
  
 
The House of Lords Select Committee on European Union identified ÔdifficultiesÕ 
with the distinction drawn by Mrs Jowell between sexual conduct and sexual identity 
for the following reasons: 
 
It is not easy to draw clear lines between identity and conduct or to determine 
the constraints that may be imposed on the enjoyment of private life. One 
could imagine a situation in which the headmaster of a religious school was 
homosexual, but kept this part of his life wholly private and separate from his 
																																																								
39
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC (n 20) art 4(2). 
40
 ibid. 
41
 House of Lords (n 38) para 47. 
42
 ibid. 
43
 ibid. 
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work in the school. He might then be exposed by a newspaper. In such 
circumstances it is not clear what rights either he or his employer would be 
able to claim under Article 4(2) of the Directive.
 44
 
 
Whether Article 4 of the Directive permits a difference in treatment based on sexual 
conduct, and how such a difference in treatment relates to sexual orientation (or 
identity), was at the heart of debates in the United Kingdom Parliament when the 
Directive was transposed into United Kingdom law.  
 
 
III. THE ROLE OF THE COE DURING THE PROCESS OF TRANSPOSING 
THE DIRECTIVE INTO UNITED KINGDOM LAW 
 
European Union member states were required to make provisions to ensure 
compliance with the Directive by 2 December 2003.
45
 The United Kingdom 
government decided to meet its obligation by making secondary legislation under 
powers conferred by the European Communities Act 1972.
46
 Therefore, in late 2001, 
the government issued a consultation document inviting views about, inter alia, the 
introduction of new legislation in Great Britain that would outlaw discrimination in 
employment and vocational training on the grounds of sexual orientation and religion 
or belief.
47
 The content of this document was informed by Ôinformal consultationÕ 
with a number of organisations, including the General Synod of the CoE.
48
 The 
consultation document paid specific attention to Article 4(2) of the Directive and 
proposed that a provision based on that Article would be included in new legislation 
to allow organisations, which have an ethos based on religion or belief, to pursue 
employment policies necessary to ensure the preservation of that ethos.
49
 The 
consultation document stated that under the proposed provision a religious 
organisation would, for example, Ôbe able to demonstrate that it is a genuine 
requirement that all staff Ð not just senior staff or people with a proselytising function 
																																																								
44
 ibid para 48. 
45
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC (n 20) art 18. 
46
 European Communities Act 1972, s 2(2).  
47
 Department of Trade and Industry, Towards Equality and Diversity: Implementing the Employment 
and Race Directives (DTI 2001) 
48
 ibid para A33.  
49
 ibid para 13.14. 
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Ð should belong to the religion concerned, so as to ensure the preservation of the 
organisationÕs particular ethosÕ.
50
 However, in line with Article 4(2) of the Directive, 
the consultation document stated that the proposed provision would Ônot allow 
religious or belief organisations to discriminate on other groundsÕ.
51
 
 
When the first draft of the EESOR 2003 was published in October 2002, it contained 
an Ôexception for genuine occupational requirementÕ which allowed an employer to 
treat individuals differently on the grounds of sexual orientation if Ôhaving regard to 
the nature of the employment or the context in which it is carried out É being of a 
particular sexual orientation is a genuine and determining occupational requirementÕ 
and Ôit is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular caseÕ.
52 This 
exception, designed to enable employers to specify sexual orientation as a genuine 
occupational requirement during the recruitment, promotion, transferring and training 
of employees, was formulated to follow the wording of the general exception 
contained in the Directive.
53
 A similar exception for a genuine occupational 
requirement was simultaneously proposed in respect of existing anti-discrimination 
legislation relating to race,
54  and new anti-discrimination legislation relating to 
religion or belief.
55
 In the religion or belief legislation, reflecting the commitment 
made in the consultation document, it was proposed that a further exception be 
available when Ôan employer has an ethos based on religion or belief and, having 
regard to that ethos and to the nature of the employment or the context in which it is 
carried out É being of a particular religion or belief is a genuine occupational 
requirement for the jobÕ and Ôit is proportionate to apply that requirement in the 
particular caseÕ.
56
 This religious exception, drafted in wider terms than the general 
exception for genuine occupational requirement, proposed that an employer would not 
be required to show that being of a particular religion or belief was a determining 
(decisive) factor for a post. This religious exception was seen to follow the wording of 
Article 4(2) of the Directive.  
																																																								
50
 ibid para 13.12.  
51
 ibid. 
52
 EESOR 2003, draft published for consultation on 22 October 2002, reg 7. 
53
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC (n 20) art 4(1). 
54
 Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, draft published for consultation in 2002 
(undated), reg 6. 
55
 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, draft published for consultation on 22 
October 2002, reg 7(2). 
56
 ibid reg 7(3).   
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The provisions contained in the draft EESOR 2003 and the corresponding religion or 
belief legislation had the overwhelming support of those who participated in the 
consultation exercise. In respect of the genuine occupational requirement exception, 
95% of respondents to the consultation (619 of 654) had agreed that the legislation 
should contain a general provision allowing employers to recruit staff on the basis of 
a genuine occupational requirement in the limited circumstances in which this could 
be justified.
57
 In respect of the religious exception granted to an employer that has an 
ethos based on religion or belief, 67% of organisations that had responded (263) 
supported the proposed approach, 14% of organisations thought the approach went 
further than necessary, and only 11% of organisations thought the approach did not do 
enough to support religious or belief organisations.
58
  
 
 
A. The CoEÕs response to the draft EESOR 2003 
 
The ArchbishopsÕ Council of the CoE formally responded to the draft EESOR 2003 in 
January 2003. The focus of the CouncilÕs response was the Ôfundamental issueÕ of 
Ôthe potential conflictÕ created by the EESOR 2003 Ôbetween the requirements of the 
law and religious beliefÕ.
59
 Such conflict, the Council argued, may arise from Ôactions 
taken by the Church to enforce its own doctrines and beliefs in relation to sexual 
conductÕ, such as Ôa bishop [denying] ordination to someone in a gay or lesbian 
relationshipÕ.
60
 The Council stated that it was concerned that applying a requirement 
to employment related to sexual ÔconductÕ would subsequently be found by the courts 
to constitute unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sexual ÔorientationÕ.
61
 The 
Council argued that Ôit is crucial that they [the EESOR 2003] do not encroach on the 
freedom which all religious organisations must have to set and enforce their own 
conduct rules in relation to those who work for and represent themÕ and that 
ÔChurches and other faith-based organisations must not find themselves in a position 
																																																								
57
 Department of Trade and Industry, Equality and Diversity: The Way Ahead (DTI 2002) para 54. 
58
 ibid para 82.   
59
 ArchbishopsÕ Council of the Church of England, ÔEquality and diversity: Church of England 
response to DTI consultation documentÕ, 23 January 2003, para 19.  
60
 ibid. 
61
 ibid.  
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where the law of the land is preventing them from conscientiously applying their own 
sincerely held doctrines and beliefs on moral issuesÕ.
62
 
 
It is clear from the ArchbishopsÕ CouncilÕs response that its officials had already 
proposed a legislative ÔsolutionÕ to its ÔdifficultiesÕ to the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and that this had not been accepted and incorporated into the draft 
EESOR 2003.
63
 The proposed solution was in the form of a provision Ð modeled on 
an existing provision in sex discrimination legislation that provided an exception in 
respect of the employment of ministers of religion
64
 Ð that afforded a general 
exemption for organised religions from the requirements of the EESOR 2003. The 
CouncilÕs proposed exception was worded as follows: 
 
Nothing in parts II to IV of these Regulations [Discrimination in the 
Employment Field, Discrimination in the Vocational Training Field etc.] shall 
render unlawful anything done for the purposes or in connection with an 
organised religion so as to comply with the doctrines of the religion or avoid 
offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant number of its 
followers.
65
 
 
This proposed exception was worded to ensure that the CoE was given the widest 
possible scope to exempt its activities from the requirements of the EESOR 2003. It 
sought to allow the CoE to do anything in respect of employment and vocational 
training in order to comply with its doctrines or avoid offending the religious 
susceptibilities of a significant number of its followers. The Council Ôstrongly urge[d] 
the GovernmentÕ to accept this exception and stated that it would Ôwant the 
opportunity for discussions at a very senior level of Government É if a satisfactory 
solution cannot be foundÕ.
66
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B. The government redrafts the EESOR 2003 in response to the CoE 
 
The government clearly decided to meet the ArchbishopsÕ CouncilÕs request because 
the exception proposed by the Council was incorporated, in modified form, into the 
final draft of the EESOR 2003 that was placed before Parliament in May 2003. This 
draft of the EESOR 2003 contained, in regulation 7(3), an exception that disapplied 
certain anti-discrimination provisions Ð in respect of offering and refusing any 
employment; the promotion or transfer to, or training for, any employment; and 
dismissal from any employment Ð in relation to employment for purposes of an 
organised religion. This exception was also potentially relevant in the context of 
contract work,
67
 office-holders,
68
 partnerships,
69
 vocational training,
70
 employment 
agencies and careers guidance services,
71
 and institutions of further and higher 
education.
72
 In addition, a provision was included for qualification bodies that 
disapplied anti-discrimination requirements in respect of a professional or trade 
qualification for purposes of an organised religion.
73
 Regulation 7(3) and associated 
provisions therefore provided organised religions with a broad exemption from the 
anti-discrimination requirements of the EESOR 2003.  
 
Regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003 introduced a three-limb ÔtestÕ that an employer 
must satisfy in order to be exempt from certain requirements of the EESOR 2003. 
First, any employment must be for the Ôpurposes of an organised religionÕ.
74
 Second, 
a requirement Ôrelated to sexual orientationÕ must be applied either to Ôcomply with 
the doctrines of the religionÕ or Ôto avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious 
convictions of a significant number of the religionÕs followersÕ.
75
 And, third, it must 
be the case that either Ôthe person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet 
itÕ or Ôthe employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable for 
him not to be satisfied, that that person meets itÕ.
76  
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The wording of the first two limbs of the regulation 7(3) test closely match the 
provision proposed by the ArchbishopsÕ Council and, as we argue below, can be seen 
as the direct result of the CouncilÕs demand that the CoE be granted a much wider 
exception than that contained in the general genuine occupational requirement 
exception.
77
 The wording adopted allowed an employer to apply, to employment for 
purposes of an organised religion,
78
 a requirement Ôrelated to sexual orientationÕ. This 
made the regulation 7(3) exception wider in scope than the general genuine 
occupational requirement exception, which was limited to Ôbeing of a particular 
sexual orientationÕ.
79
 The phrase Ôrelated to sexual orientationÕ was designed to 
include, as requested by the Council, sexual ÔbehaviourÕ rather than mere ÔorientationÕ 
and, therefore, allow a requirement to be applied to ÔconductÕ.
80
 In addition, 
regulation 7(3), in line with the CouncilÕs proposal, did not specify that applying a 
requirement related to sexual orientation must be ÔproportionateÕ in each case. This is 
in contrast to the general genuine occupational requirement exception in the EESOR 
2003,
81
 as well as both the general and religious genuine occupational requirement 
exceptions in the religion or belief regulations, which specified that the application of 
any requirement must be ÔproportionateÕ.
82
 The third limb of the regulation 7(3) test 
cannot be seen to correspond with the CouncilÕs proposal and, as we discuss below, it 
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created a hurdle that the CoE has been required to carefully navigate.
83
  
 
The principal evidence to suggest that regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003 was 
designed to satisfy the demands of the ArchbishopsÕ Council exists in the form of 
documented interaction between representatives of the DTI and the Joint Committee 
on Statutory Instruments (JCSI). When the JCSI examined the EESOR 2003, it 
received a memorandum from the DTI, and heard oral evidence from DTI 
representatives, in respect of regulation 7(3). The DTI memorandum stated that 
regulation 7(3) was Ôdesigned to reflect specific comments received in response to the 
draft regulationsÕ which made Ôclear that the [general genuine occupational 
requirement] could cause practical difficulties in relation to employment for purposes 
of an organised religionÕ.
84
 The memorandum elaborates that, having made a decision 
to insert a new provision, Ôthe [DTI] met a small number of representatives from 
churches to discuss the scope of the exceptionÕ.
85
 When giving oral evidence to the 
JCSI, Mr Magyar, Legal Director of the DTI, explained the nature of the meeting with 
the Ôsmall number of representatives from churchesÕ: 
 
the real reason for the meetings was to find out precisely what the problem 
was for the churches. It has never been part of the GovernmentÕs policy to 
interfere with religious doctrine or the genuinely and strongly held views of 
religious followers. The purpose of the meetings was to find out precisely 
what the problems were for the churches so as to enable us to draft a provision 
that addressed the problem, but I think it would be fair to say that the churches 
still felt that we had not gone anywhere near far enough in the provision that 
we drafted. We however felt that this would address the specific problems that 
they had raised and that is why we were talking to them.
86
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Although the DTI refer to having met with representatives of ÔchurchesÕ,
87
 it is 
reasonable to assume that the CoE took a principal role during negotiations with the 
DTI and was instrumental in ensuring the inclusion of regulation 7(3) in the EESOR 
2003.
88
 This is not only because the ArchbishopsÕ Council had previously demanded 
Ôthe opportunity for discussions at a very senior level of GovernmentÕ
89
 but also 
because, having secured those discussions, the wording of regulation 7(3) closely 
resembled the CouncilÕs own proposed provision. Indeed, in a subsequent letter to the 
JCSI, the Secretary General of the General Synod and the ArchbishopsÕ Council, 
William Fittall, confirmed that the CoEÕs primary objective during negotiations had 
been:  
 
to ensure that they [the EESOR 2003] do not deny faith communities a broad 
measure of freedom to determine what requirements in relation to sexual 
behaviour should apply to those who wish to serve or represent them, even 
though this might otherwise constitute direct or indirect discrimination in 
relation to sexual orientation.
90
 
 
In other words, as Mr Fittall explained, the inclusion of regulation 7(3) in the EESOR 
2003 directly met the CoEÕs request that it be furnished with a provision that enabled 
it to Ôdefend successfully the application of a marriage or abstinence policy against a 
discrimination claim by arguing that the requirement was about behaviour rather than 
mere orientationÕ.
91
 It is clear, therefore, that, as the High Court subsequently 
concluded, regulation 7(3) of the EESOR Ôwas added as a result of representations 
from the Churches, including in particular, it would seem, the ArchbishopsÕ Council 
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of the Church of EnglandÕ.
92
 
 
 
IV. PARLIAMENTARY ACCEPTANCE OF THE COEÕS RELIGIOUS 
EXCEPTION 
 
The CoE was successful in lobbying the DTI to include regulation 7(3) in the final 
draft of the EESOR 2003 that was laid before both Houses of the United Kingdom 
Parliament in May 2003. However, regulation 7(3) attracted considerable 
parliamentary scrutiny and criticism. In its report of 13 June 2003, the JCSI published 
its view that there was doubt as to whether regulation 7(3) was intra vires.
93
 The 
JCSIÕs doubts arose from the potential for regulation 7(3) to permit a difference of 
treatment based on a characteristic related to sexual orientation where the 
characteristic could not be said to be a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement which was proportionate, as envisaged by the general exception 
contained in the Directive.
94
 The JCSI stated: 
 
It seems É wholly within the bounds of possibility that, for example, an 
employer considering employing a custodian who would, as part of his or her 
duties, have care of religious artefacts might determine not to employ a worker 
solely on a ground related to his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid 
conflicting with the strongly held religious beliefs of a significant number of 
the religionÕs followers. Even if those beliefs were held only by a minority of 
the religionÕs followers, and by those located at only one of several places 
where the post holder might be required to work, the discrimination would 
seem É apparently to be allowed by regulation 7(3) [of the EESOR 2003] É 
Yet it is open to question whether either the intention or effect of Article 4.1 
[the general genuine occupational qualification exception in the Directive] is 
to allow the personal beliefs (even of a majority within an organisation) to 
determine the position, on the basis that they are part of the context in which 
the work is to be carried out and, in the view of the employer, the factor is 
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decisive. Even if a characteristic of the worker could be said to be a Ôgenuine 
and determining occupational requirementÕ in these circumstances there seems 
É to be a doubt as to whether the requirement is proportionate as the 
Directive requires.
95
 
 
The JCSIÕs opinion that regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003 would potentially allow 
discrimination beyond that permitted by the Directive provided the foundation for a 
motion in the House of Lords, moved by Lord Lester of Herne Hill, inviting the 
government to withdraw the draft EESOR 2003 and to amend regulation 7(3) on the 
basis that it was Ôunnecessary and unlawfulÕ.
96
 It was unlawful, Lord Lester argued, 
because it was Ôa sweepingly broad exemption clause apparently permitting a 
religious body to refuse to employ not a priest but a cleaner or messenger because of 
their sexualityÕ.
97
 There was support for Lord LesterÕs motion on the basis that, as 
Lord Avebury put it, regulation 7(3) would permit Ôbigotry and prejudiceÕ and Ôwould 
be the first time in any western country when anti-gay conduct has been approved by 
legislationÕ.
98
 
 
The CoEÕs defence of regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003 was provided by the 
Bishop of Blackburn (Alan Chesters) who urged peers to Ôrecognise that there are 
genuine issues of religious liberty hereÕ.
99
 Bishop ChestersÕ principal defence rested 
on the assertion that regulation 7(3) was not concerned with sexual orientation Ôas 
suchÕ but with Ôposts and orders where, irrespective of sexual orientation, be it 
heterosexual or homosexual, the requirement remains for marriage or abstinenceÕ.
100
 
He went on to argue that the exception was Ôemphatically not about pandering to 
prejudicesÕ and would only be used by the CoE Ôwhere doctrine and strongly held 
religious convictions are at stakeÕ.
101
 The Bishop of Worcester (Peter Selby) dissented 
from this view and, with Ôsome hesitationÕ, spoke against Ôthe very strong 
representation of É the ArchbishopsÕ Council of my own churchÕ to voice his 
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Ôminority judgmentÕ against regulation 7(3).
102
 However, in doing so, Bishop Selby 
made absolutely clear that Bishop ChestersÕ remarks Ôundoubtedly reflect what the 
Government have heard from our ChurchÕ and Ôreflect the views of perhaps the 
overwhelming majority of bishopsÕ.
103
  
 
Lord Alli, who likened regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003 to Ôa provision dreamed 
up by the TalibanÕ, advanced extremely strong criticism Ð uncommon in the House of 
Lords Ð of the role of the Lords Spiritual in supporting the CoE in Ôseeking to do a 
dangerous thingÕ of Ôeffectively absenting itself from normal civil societyÕ: 
 
I say to the Lords spiritual on the BishopsÕ Benches that if they try to use the 
privilege that they enjoy É of law-making, by using the civil law as a means 
of exempting themselves or their religion from the norms and values of civil 
society, they will have diminished their role in society. Gay people may be a 
minority in society, but so too are those who actively profess a faith. Each is 
entitled to protection, but not at the expense of the rights and dignity of the 
other. That is what equality means. Today we have the opportunity to 
demonstrate that this House is a modern Chamber, one that acknowledges that 
religion has a place in the national debate, but not a dominant or superior 
one.
104
 
 
These remarks resonated with the concern of some members of the CoE that had been 
expressed at the General Synod meeting of February 2003. For example, one member 
questioned how the CoE could Ôreconcile a continuing desire to remain the 
established Church, including substantial representation in a reformed second 
chamber, with its attempts to gain exemption from some statutory legislation, for 
example in relation to human rights and employment lawÕ.
105
 Another member 
articulated a sense of dismay at the CoEÕs use of its privileged position to seek 
exemptions from equality law: 
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My heart always sinks whenever the Church considers equality measures 
proposed by secular government. That the Church has an understanding of 
justice which is distinctive is understandable and right; that the Church so 
often has a narrower understanding of justice than the secular world is 
alarming; but that the Church consequently seeks to exclude itself from 
equality measures for its own institution is depressing.
106
 
 
Despite these forms of criticism, the Lords accepted the governmentÕs position that 
regulation 7(3) was necessary if legislation outlawing sexual orientation 
discrimination was Ônot to interfere in Church doctrineÕ
107
 and, rejecting Lord LesterÕs 
motion that the draft be amended,
108
 approved the EESOR 2003.
109
 
 
Consideration of the final draft of the EESOR 2003 by the House of Commons took 
place primarily in a Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation.
110
 Much the same 
criticism as that advanced about regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003 in the House of 
Lords was advanced in the Standing Committee. Evan Harris MP, for example, stated 
that it was ÔastonishingÕ that the government was proposing regulation 7(3) when it 
was Ôsupported only by the Church of England in a confused way and whole-
heartedly by the Christian Institute and CARE [Christian Action Research and 
Education]Õ.
111
 There was also criticism from those who, although supportive of an 
exception for organised religions, felt, as Edward Leigh MP put it, that regulation 7(3) 
was Ôa complete dogÕs dinnerÕ.
112
 The chief criticism in this respect was that the scope 
of regulation 7(3) was unclear and that, as a consequence, it may be unworkable.
113
 
Nevertheless, the Standing Committee agreed the EESOR 2003
114
 and, when it was 
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subsequently considered in the main chamber of the House of Commons, it received 
overwhelming support from MPs.
115
  
 
There was extensive media speculation about why the government had seemingly 
capitulated to Ôpressure from the ArchbishopsÕ CouncilÕ and included regulation 7(3) 
in the EESOR 2003.
116
 There was also considerable condemnation of Parliament for 
having accepted an Ôodious provisionÕ
117
 that was seen as a mechanism for ensuring 
that Ôequality stops at the church gatesÕ.
118
 Such strong criticism is unsurprising given 
that regulation 7(3) afforded organised religions a wider exception from anti-
discrimination provisions relating to sexual orientation than that available to other 
employers. Moreover, despite the CoEÕs claim that regulation 7(3) Ôattempts to strike 
a fair balance between the rights of individuals [in respect of sexual orientation] and 
the freedom of faith communities to apply their own beliefs and convictions in 
relation to those who serve and represent themÕ,
119
 the effect of regulation 7(3) was to 
create an imbalance between religion and sexual orientation in equality law. As  
argued elsewhere, the religious exception included in the EESOR 2003 can be seen to 
create a hierarchy in equality law because no bespoke exception equivalent to 
regulation 7(3) exists to enable organisations based on sexual orientation to refuse to 
employ, promote, train or dismiss someone on the basis of applying a requirement 
related to religion or belief.
120
  
 
 
V. THE COE DEFENDS ITSELF USING THE RELIGIOUS EXCEPTION 
 
Less than three years after the enactment of the EESOR 2003, the CoE became 
embroiled in an employment dispute that led to it having to defend itself using 
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regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003.
121
 The dispute concerned Hereford DioceseÕs 
refusal of employment to John Reaney, following his application for the post of 
Youth Officer. Mr Reaney, although having been interviewed and unanimously 
recommended for the post by a panel of eight people, was ultimately declined 
employment by the Bishop of Hereford (Anthony Priddis). Bishop Priddis declined to 
employ Mr Reaney on the basis that, because Mr Reaney had previously been in a 
same-sex sexual relationship that had recently ended, he did not feel that Mr Reaney 
was able to meet the applied requirement to be celibate.
122
 Although Mr Reaney had 
committed to living a celibate life whilst in post, Bishop Priddis Ôfound himself 
wondering whether his [Mr ReaneyÕs] heart and his emotions could deliver what [Mr 
ReaneyÕs] head saidÕ.
123
 Bishop Priddis informed Mr Reaney: Ôthe issue is not about 
sexual orientation but rather about practice and lifestyle and the evidence of those 
from a long enough period of stability in oneÕs lifeÕ.
124
 In response to this, Mr Reaney 
claimed that he had been subjected, inter alia, to direct discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation and that this was unlawful under the terms of the EESOR 2003.  
 
When Mr ReaneyÕs complaint was considered by the Employment Tribunal, the key 
issue was whether the refusal to employ him for the reasons given was permissible 
under regulation 7(3) of the EESOR. To determine the answer to this question, the 
Employment Tribunal considered whether Bishops PriddisÕ refusal to employ Mr 
Reaney satisfied the three-limb test contained in regulation 7(3). In respect of the first 
limb of the test, the Employment Tribunal held that the post in question could be 
deemed to meet the requirement that the employment is for purposes of an organised 
religion.
125
 The Employment Tribunal was also satisfied that the refusal to offer Mr 
																																																								
121
 Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance (Cardiff Employment Tribunal, 17 July 2007, 
1602844/2006).  
122
 The applied requirement was that a person with a ÔhomophileÕ orientation who is involved in 
pastoral practice within the CoE should abstain from committing same-sex sexual acts. This 
requirement was derived from Church of England House of Bishops (n 11).  
123
 Reaney (n 121) para 41. 
124
 ibid.  
125
 ibid para 102. In reaching this conclusion the Employment Tribunal drew upon the observations in 
R (Amicus) (n 78) regarding the scope of the exception. In R (Amicus) ibid para 115, Richards J stated 
that the exception was Ôvery narrowÕ, had to be Ôconstrued strictly since it is a derogation from the 
principle of equal treatmentÕ, had to be Ôconstrued purposively so as to ensure, so far as possible, 
compatibility with the DirectiveÕ, and could Ôbe seen to afford an exception only in very limited 
circumstancesÕ. Whether the Employment TribunalÕs reading of the exception in respect of the post in 
question conforms to these principles is open to debate. As Ahdar and Leigh note, Ôthe Tribunal 
adopted a reading of the scope of the exception by applying it to a youth worker post which is wider 
	 25	
Reaney employment met the second limb of the test because it was the result of 
Bishop Priddis applying a requirement related to sexual orientation so as to comply 
with the doctrines of the religion
126
 and so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly 
held religious convictions of a significant number of the religionÕs followers.
127
 This 
left the Employment Tribunal to consider, in respect of the third limb of the test, 
whether Bishop PriddisÕ decision not to offer Mr Reaney employment met the 
requirement that Ôthe employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is 
reasonable for him not to be satisfied, that that person meets [the applied 
requirement]Õ.
128
 The Employment Tribunal stated that, since this aspect of the test 
was worded in the present tense, the question of whether it was met had to be asked 
and answered on present circumstances since Ôthe future is not known to any personÕ 
and in Ôan ordinary employment context a potential applicant for a job cannot give 
cast-iron guarantees as to circumstances which may happen in the futureÕ.
129
 On this 
basis, the Employment Tribunal rejected Bishop PriddisÕ claim that it was reasonable 
for him not to be satisfied that Mr Reaney met the requirement to be celibate since 
Bishop Priddis had no evidence to suggest that Mr Reaney was not telling the truth 
when he said that he was no longer in a sexual relationship.
130
 Moreover, the 
Employment Tribunal held that, even if looking to the future, it was not reasonable 
for Bishop Priddis to Ôrely upon some vague idea that a person whose relationship has 
recently come to an end cannot be relied upon to state a future intentionÕ (and that it 
Ômay well be that there was some unconscious discrimination on the part of Bishop 
Priddis in the refusal to accept the assurances of [Mr Reaney] because he was a gay 
manÕ).
131
 Mr ReaneyÕs claim of direct discrimination was therefore successful.  
 
Although the CoE lost this case, the Diocese of Hereford regarded the Employment 
TribunalÕs judgment as a Ômixed blessingÕ and Bishop Priddis stated that he was 
Ôdisappointed but not completely downÕ.
132
 This equivocal reaction is not surprising 
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because, as the ArchbishopsÕ Council of the CoE made clear, the CoE very much 
welcomed some aspects of the judgment.
133
 The Council was, for instance, positive 
about the Employment Tribunal having Ôhelpfully confirmedÕ that regulation 7(3) of 
the EESOR 2003 was applicable to Ôsome non clergy postsÕ.
134
 Although the Council 
implicitly conceded that Bishop Priddis had Ôtaken the wrong decisionÕ, it was 
confident that the Employment TribunalÕs judgment showed that regulation 7(3) Ôwill 
continue to provide important protection for churches É ensuring that their 
recruitment policies can reflect the organisationÕs beliefsÕ.
135
 The CoE was able to 
express this view with such certainty because, as Julian Rivers notes, the judgment of 
the Employment Tribunal provided dioceses with the means by which to avoid falling 
foul of an adverse judgment in the future: the Ôobvious solution from the point of view 
of the diocese is to become stricter in its criteriaÕ.
136
 In other words, CoE dioceses can 
more explicitly incorporate a requirement related to sexual orientation into their 
recruitment policies and processes in order to avoid a recruiting Bishop falling at the 
third limb of the test contained in regulation 7(3). Such a requirement may, for 
example, be expressed in a job advertisement that states that a post-holder must 
adhere to Ôtraditional church beliefs and teaching in matters of faith and conductÕ and 
Ôshare and endorse the understanding [of] sexual and moral conduct and lifestyleÕ of 
the recruiting church.
137
 
 
 
VI. THE COE MAINTAINS THE RELIGIOUS EXCEPTION:  
THE EQUALITY ACT 2010 
 
The EESOR 2003 was revoked by the Equality Act 2010, which consolidated and 
extended anti-discrimination law in Great Britain. When the Equality Bill 2008/09 
was introduced in the United Kingdom Parliament, it reproduced in largely similar 
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form the religious exception contained in regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003. 
However, the exception differed from regulation 7(3) in two key ways. The first 
difference was that the exception in the Equality Bill stated that when a requirement 
related to sexual orientation was applied as a means of complying with the doctrines 
of the religion (now called the Ôcompliance principleÕ) or as a means of avoiding 
conflict with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the 
religionÕs followers (now called the Ônon-conflict principleÕ) that this must be 
ÔproportionateÕ.
138
 As we detailed above, no proportionality test was included in 
regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003, in contrast to both the general and religious 
genuine occupational requirement exceptions contained in the religion or belief 
regulations.
139
 Therefore, proposing the inclusion of a proportionately test in the 
religious exception in respect of sexual orientation can be seen as an attempt to 
harmonize these aspects of equality law.
140
 The second difference was that the 
exception in the Equality Bill included a definition of the type of employment deemed 
to be Ôfor the purposes of an organised religionÕ: specifically, employment that 
Ôwholly or mainlyÕ involved Ôleading or assisting in the observation of liturgical or 
ritualistic practices of the religionÕ or Ôpromoting or explaining the doctrine of the 
religion (whether to followers of the religion or to others)Õ.
141
 The inclusion of this 
definition can be seen as an attempt to put on the face of the Bill the governmentÕs 
original intention that the exception should apply to Ôa very narrow range of 
employment: ministers of religion, plus a small number of posts outside the clergy, 
including those who exist to promote and represent religionÕ.
142
  
 
The changes to the religious exception proposed in the Equality Bill were widely 
regarded as an attempt to narrow its scope. For example, John Mason MP argued that 
the exception Ôleaves outÕ forms of employment Ôthat might otherwise be expected to 
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be includedÕ.
143
 To illustrate this point, Mr Mason cited the case taken by Mr Reaney 
against the CoE that we discussed above: 
 
In Reaney v. the Diocese of Hereford É the employment tribunal rejected the 
argument that the exemption applied only to Church ministers, and ruled that 
Churches could also require a youth worker to adhere to their doctrines on 
marriage and celibacy. However, explanatory note 747 on page E182 [of the 
Equality Bill 2008/09] insists that the new wording in paragraph 2 excludes 
youth workers. In that case, the new wording is intended to narrow the 
exception.
144
 
 
In fact, the Explanatory Notes cited by Mr Mason referred to a requirement that Ôa 
church youth worker É be heterosexualÕ,
145
 which was not the issue considered in 
Reaney. Nevertheless, some scholars have agreed with the view advanced by Mr 
Mason and argued that the changes to the religious exception proposed by the 
Equality Bill would have narrowed its scope and, as a result, reversed the 
interpretation adopted in Reaney that the post of Youth Officer fell within it.
146
 In our 
view, this is far from conclusive since in Reaney the employment in question Ð which 
was to Ôco-ordinate and to encourage and to promote church based youth 
organisationsÕ Ð was deemed by the Employment Tribunal to be Ôone of the small 
number of jobs which would be closely associated with the promotion of the 
ChurchÕ
147
 and, as such, it is likely that such posts would have continued to have been 
deemed to be concerned with Ôpromoting or explaining the doctrine of the religionÕ. 
Therefore, the definition of employment Ôfor the purposes of an organised religionÕ 
proposed in the Equality Bill can be seen as an attempt to reflect the interpretation of 
the religious exception adopted in Reaney rather than as a means of reversing it. 
 
However, the CoEÕs view, as expressed by the Secretary General of the General 
Synod, William Fittall, was that there was Ôno doubtÕ that the changes proposed by 
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the Equality Bill represented Ôa substantial narrowing of the present exemptionÕ.
148
 
Mr Fittall stated that the CoE wished to Ôpreserve religious libertyÕ and argued that 
 
[h]owever wrong people might believe individual Churches or other faith 
groups are on some issues Ð whether it is their attitude to divorce, whether 
women should be priests or same-sex conduct Ð it must ultimately be part of 
the teaching of that particular faith strand.
149
 
 
There was strong disagreement with the CoEÕs interpretation of the changes proposed 
by the Equality Bill by, for example, the British Humanist Association and the 
Muslim WomenÕs Network.
150
 However, the Catholic Church agreed with the CoE 
that the proposed changes represented a Ôdistinct tightening of the lawÕ.
151
  
 
On the basis of such concerns, amendments to the Equality Bill designed to omit the 
references to ÔproportionateÕ and the definition of employment from the religious 
exception were proposed, but subsequently withdrawn, at Committee stage in the 
House of Commons.
152
 A further attempt to omit the definition of employment was 
defeated at Report stage in the House of Commons.
153
 When the Bill reached the 
House of Lords, the Archbishop of York (John Sentamu) provided an extensive 
critique of the definition of employment included in the religious exception: 
 
the definition of employment Ôfor the purposes of an organised religionÕ fails 
to reflect the way in which members of the church and many other religious 
groups understand their faith to be the bedrock of their lives É The exemption 
is flawed even on its own terms. At the height of the floods in Cumbria, I 
visited Cockermouth, Workington and Keswick. A major part of the relief 
effort in those places was being carried out by Churches Together, with Christ 
Church, Cockermouth, as the hub of the activity. The church had been 
converted into a relief centre and the rector, Reverend Wendy Sanders, and 
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members of the churches did outstanding work which made a huge difference 
to the whole relief programme. They were, of course, providing help and care 
to all people, regardless of faith or no faith. How would the Bill classify this 
activity? Would it come under Ôliturgical or ritualistic practicesÕ or Ôexplaining 
the doctrine of the religionÕ?
154
 
 
Archbishop Sentamu was not entirely clear whether he would seek to apply a 
requirement related to sexual orientation in the context of work that involved offering 
aid to victims of natural disasters, but what was clear was his desire to maintain the 
maximum scope of the religious exception. He stated that the religious exception 
would be Ôsignificantly narrowedÕ by the changes proposed in the Equality Bill and 
argued that Ô[t]here is a danger here of legislation by stealth. We need to hold the line 
where it was set in 2003Õ.
155
 
 
The CoE was successful in its campaign to Ôhold the lineÕ set by regulation 7(3) of the 
EESOR 2003 when it sponsored amendments to the Equality Bill, moved by Baroness 
OÕCathain, that were accepted at Committee stage.
156
 On moving the amendments, 
which omitted the references to ÔproportionateÕ and the definition of employment 
from the religious exception, Baroness OÕCathain explained that they maintained the 
Ôlegal status quo, which is supported by the Church of England, the Roman Catholic 
Church and othersÕ.
157
 The Bishop of Winchester (Michael Scott-Joynt) stated that the 
aim of the amendments was to omit provisions that the CoE found Ôprofoundly 
objectionableÕ and to Ôrestore the status quo, which we believe to be entirely 
defensibleÕ.
158
 The parliamentary activity of the Lords Spiritual was therefore pivotal 
in ensuring the success of the amendments, and their voting was decisive in one of the 
two Divisions by which the amendments were accepted.
159
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The government acquiesced to the House of Lords and did not seek to reject its 
amendments to the religious employment exception when they were considered in the 
House of Commons.
160
 As a consequence, the Equality Act 2010 maintains the 
employment exception for organised religions largely in the form enacted in 
regulation 7(3) of the EESOR 2003.
161
 Organised religions therefore retain access to a 
unique and bespoke provision that allows them wider scope than that available to 
other employers to discriminate on grounds related to sexual orientation. Crucially, 
unlike other employers, who are only able to apply a requirement to ÔhaveÕ a 
particular sexual orientation,
162
 organised religions can apply a requirement ÔrelatedÕ 
to sexual orientation. Moreover, organised religions, unlike other employers, are not 
required to demonstrate that applying a requirement Ôis a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aimÕ.
163
  
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this article we have examined the ways in which the CoE has sought to influence 
the legislative process in order to ensure that it and other religious organisations are 
provided with exceptions in statute law that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation. Such exceptions effectively license the CoE and other religious 
organisations to discriminate against individuals because of either their homosexual 
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orientation or conduct. By providing an in-depth analysis of the life of one piece of 
legislation, our aim has been to highlight the approach of the CoE, through its various 
limbs, to actively shaping statute law in ways that are advantageous to it. Whilst it has 
been claimed that there is Ôno culture of the Church of England publicly lobbying 
governmentÕ and that the CoE suffers from a form of ÔreticenceÕ in its dealings with 
government,
164
 our analysis clearly shows that the CoE has an organised and 
systematic approach to attempting to fashion sexual orientation equality law. This 
approach is sometimes publicly visible (for example, when the Lords Spiritual make 
interventions in Parliament) and, at other times, is less amenable to public scrutiny.  
 
Our analysis of the strategies and tactics employed by the CoE to successfully secure 
religious exceptions in statute law offers some challenge to claims about the decline 
of the authority of religion as a result of a secularist onslaught.
165
 Although 
widespread social change has meant that in contemporary British society Ôthe 
churches have become increasingly irrelevant in the new cultural and ethical 
landscapeÕ that most people inhabit,
166
 the CoE clearly retains its powerful presence 
in the process by which statute law is made in the United Kingdom. Therefore, 
despite the decline of the hegemony of Ônormative Christian cultureÕ
167
 in the United 
Kingdom that might be inferred from an analysis of trends in church attendance, rates 
of baptism or other religious practices, the CoE is still able to exert considerable 
inﬂuence upon the legislative process. 
 
Our analysis also contributes to long-standing and on-going debates about the CoEÕs 
involvement in the legislative process. One aspect of this debate concerns whether it 
is appropriate in a liberal democracy for the Lords Spiritual to exercise a legislative 
function in the United Kingdom Parliament, by way of which the CoE is able to 
directly shape statute law. Although the number of Lords Spiritual in the House of 
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Lords limits their overall influence,
168
 and whilst there is no official ÔBishopsÕ whipÕ 
that requires each Lord Spiritual to follow a Ôparty lineÕ,
169
 the presence of the Lords 
Spiritual in the House of Lords provides the CoE with a direct means by which to 
shape law. Whilst all religious organisations can seek to lobby Parliament, only the 
CoE has a permanent and consistent voice inside Parliament. The CoE has exercised 
its parliamentary voice to influence a wide range of legislation relating to sexual 
orientation equality, including the recent Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013,
170
 
and is currently actively seeking exceptions for faith schools in relation to current 
proposed reforms to the statutory framework governing sex education in England.
171
 
 
Relatedly, the analysis presented in this article contributes to debates about the need 
for further reform of the House of Lords to either limit or remove the influence of the 
Lords Spiritual in the legislative process. Whilst the Lords Spiritual have always had 
a presence in the House of Lords,
172
 the reformed composition of the House Ð which 
now largely comprises Life Peers appointed on merit
173
 Ð has made the position of the 
Lords Spiritual anomalous.
174
 Whereas the Lords Spiritual could once be seen as a 
category of Ôspecialist peerÕ akin to the now-departed Law Lords,
175
 their presence 
might now be regarded as anachronistic. That view was expressed and endorsed by 
signatories to a petition to the government in 2016 which called for the removal of the 
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Lords Spirtual from the House of Lords on the basis that the CoE Ôis quite out of step 
with UK Law and indeed common humanityÕ.
176
 
 
Perhaps the most important debate to which this article contributes concerns the 
extent to which the United Kingdom Parliament should legislate to exempt the CoE 
and other religious organisations from law requiring people to be treated equally 
regardless of their sexual orientation. Our detailed examination of the legislative 
accommodation of the CoEÕs prejudice against homosexuality raises questions about 
whether it would be more appropriate, in a liberal democracy, for Parliament to 
require the CoE and other religious organisations to conform to the standards 
expected of secular institutions. Although Parliament has decided that it will not 
generally Ôlegislate over and above, or directly at, the Church of EnglandÕ,
177
 it 
certainly retains the authority to do so.
178
 Moreover, the CoE is required, as it has 
been since 1533, to abide by the principle that it does not make or execute any 
Ôcanons constitucions or ordynanceÕ that are Ôcontraryaunt or repugnant to the Kynges 
prerogatyve Royall or the customes lawes or statutes of this RealmeÕ,
179
 unless it is 
afforded an exception to do so.
180
 The key question, therefore, is whether Parliament 
should, in the interests of advancing equality on the grounds of sexual orientation, 
cease to accommodate the hostility of the CoE (and other religious organisations) to 
homosexuality. When attending to this question, we hope that, in addition to 
considering issues such as the need to strike an appropriate balance between the right 
to freedom of religion and the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of 
sexual orientation,
181
 legislators will give more critical consideration to the privileged 
position of the CoE in the legislative process and whether there is a need to reform or 
curtail it. 
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